I. INTRODUCTION In May 2010 the California legislature passed AB 585, an assembly bill extending the state's post mortem right of publicity to people whose identities have commercial value because of their death. 1 The bill amended California Civil Code section 3344.1, which previously protected only people whose identities had commercial value at the time of their death. 2 AB 585 was proposed in response to the then-recent controversy surrounding the sale of tshirts protesting the war in Iraq and featuring the names of American soldiers who died while serving there. 3 The law now entitles families of deceased soldiers to compensation for such unauthorized commercial use. 4 At least five other U.S. states statutorily recognize publicity rights for deceased soldiers; 5 however, AB 585 was unique in that it extended protection to the non-military deceased as well. 6 In general, the U.S. right of publicity is "the inherent right of every human being to control the commercial use of his or her identity." 7 Although nearly two-thirds of all U.S. states recognize some form of publicity protection, either by statute or common law, 8 a sufficient justification for how and why the law provides such a right remains in dispute. 9 Despite some initial disinclination among courts and commentators toward categorizing the right of publicity 
II. IDENTITY APPROPRIATION IN THE UNITED STATES
In order to appreciate California's statutory contradiction, it is important first to examine generally the U.S. right of publicity's origins in privacy law, its evolution into a pure property right, and several resulting distinctions between privacy and publicity as they relate to California's addition of a per mortem statute.
A. The Right of Privacy
The right of privacy was first conceptualized in 1890 by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis.
2 ' Concerned by the rising practice of gossip j ournalism in the United States and the technological innovations that afforded it, 22 Warren and Brandeis sought to extract from existing case law an independent claim against the unauthorized publication of private facts and photographs, for which the law at time offered no protection. 2 3 As published in their seminal article,
The Right to Privacy, Warren and Brandeis found a remedy, primarily in the law of copyright, by extending authorial control of intentional creations to the incidental. 24 Their proposed "right to privacy" was aimed famously at protecting "the right to enjoy life" and "the right to be let alone., 25
Protection of Emotional Interests
Despite wide scholastic recognition of The Right to Privacy, the alleged 22. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 21, at 195. "Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction that 'what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops." ' Id. 23. right lost its first battle in court.
2 6 In Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., a young girl named Abigail Roberson sought an injunction against and compensation for emotional injuries caused by a milling company's use of her likeness to promote the sale of flour without her consent. 27 The Franklin Mills
Company published prints featuring Roberson's image encircled by the company's name and slogan, 28 and when Roberson was recognized by others in public, she was scoffed at and jeered, resulting in her mental anguish.
29
Although acknowledging Warren and Brandeis's "clever article, ' 30 the New York Court of Appeals rejected Roberson's pioneering privacy claim.
3 ' The court majority concluded that the right of privacy had not yet received recognition at law 32 and that such recognition was a concern for the state legislature. 33 Further, the majority emphasized that the law protects people's body, reputation, and property but not their "peace of mind," "feelings," or "happiness." 34 Four dissenting judges, however, embraced the Warren and Brandeis article, finding the right of privacy to be the complement of everyone's longstanding right to an inviolate person.
3 5 These dissenters dismissed the absence of exact precedent in favor of equity, 36 whether the remedy was to be found in an analogical extension of common-law principles or the application of natural justice. 
Id.

29.
Id. Roberson alleged that she was "greatly humiliated... causing her great distress and suffering both in body and mind; that she was made sick and suffered a severe nervous shock, was confined to her bed and compelled to employ a physician," resulting in $15,000 in damages.
Id.
30 . an extraordinary view which, while conceding the right of a person to be protected against the unauthorized circulation of an unpublished lecture, letter, drawing, or other ideal property, yet, would deny the same protection to a person, whose portrait was unauthorizedly obtained, and made use of, for commercial purposes." Id 37. Id. at 449. "It would be a reproach to equitable jurisprudence, if equity were powerless. in remedying a wrong, which, in the progress of civilization, has been made possible as the result of new social, or commercial conditions." Id. 38. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 1:17; see Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 40 Pavesich, who had never used the company's services and had never made any such statements, found the use of his image offensive and successfully sued the company for invasion of privacy. 4 ' The Supreme
42
Court of Georgia adopted the Roberson dissenting opinion in its entirety, establishing the common law right of privacy as the personal right of every individual "to be let alone. ' A 3
As privacy law developed across the United States, not all people found themselves within the ambit of its protection. Specifically, celebrity plaintiffs found it difficult to recover for the unauthorized appropriation of their names and likenesses because of the right's emotional focus. 4 In one famous case, 45 O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected an invasion of privacy claim brought by a professional football player named Davey O'Brien. 46 The well-known player sought damages from a distributor of "Pabst Famous Blue Ribbon Beer" for the company's use of his photograph in its advertising calendar. 47 O'Brien argued that he suffered damage to his name by its commercial association with beer 48 and that the advertisement falsely indicated that he endorsed the company's product. 49 The court concluded, however, that the publicity O'Brien received "was only that which he had been constantly seeking and receiving" as a public figure. 50 Because O'Brien was not a "private person," he had no claim for invasion of the right of privacy. 
Privacy's Inalienability
Privacy's inalienability was another challenge that celebrities faced as a result of the right's emotional focus. In Hanna Mfg. Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., a longtime baseball bat manufacturer, Hillerich & Bradsby, sought to enjoin a newcomer to the business, Hanna Manufacturing, from imprinting bats 12 with the names of famous baseball players. Because Hillerich & Bradsby maintained exclusive contracts with many players for the use of their names, autographs, and photographs in connection with the sale of baseball bats, the company argued that the players had assigned to it their property rights in their names. 53 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, denied the manufacturer's injunction. 4 Finding the contracts simply to be a waiver of the players' right of privacy rather than an assignment of that right to Hillerich & Bradsby, the court emphatically stated, "Fame is not merchandise. It would help neither sportsmanship nor business to uphold the sale of a famous name to the highest bidder as property." 
Privacy's Terminability
The personal, emotional nature of the right of privacy also rendered it incapable of surviving the death of the right's holder. In Jesse James, Jr. v. Screen Gems Inc., the wife of Jesse James, Jr., son of the infamous outlaw Jesse James, sought compensation from a production company for its commercial exploitation of her deceased husband's name and personality in a biographical film titled, Bitter Heritage.
56 By her designation as "Mrs. Jesse James, Jr.," the wife claimed an interest in her deceased husband's right of privacy. 57 Yet, the court found the alleged wrong to be directed toward the decedent, not his wife, and therefore, concluded the facts of her complaint to be insufficient to constitute an invasion of privacy. 
Protection of Economic Interests
Fifteen years after Hanna Manufacturing struck out in the Fifth Circuit, and on an almost identical set of facts, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit explicitly rejected the holding of that case and gave life to the common law right of publicity. 63 In Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc., rival chewing gum manufacturers were competing for the rights to use baseball players' names and photographs on baseball cards.
64
Haelan Laboratories had exclusive agreements with certain players whose names and photographs were used by Topps Chewing Gum without Haelan's authorization. 6 ' Topps claimed that privacy was a personal and non-assignable right and that Haelan merely retained a waiver of the players' rights of privacy. 66 In rejecting this defense, the court concluded that, "in addition to and independent of th[e] right of privacy.., a man has a right in the publicity value of his photograph .... This right might be called a 'right of publicity."' 67
Publicity's Alienability
Although rightfully celebrated as the foundation of the property-based right of publicity, Haelan Laboratories, Inc. had the practical effect simply of making one's likeness alienable via assignment.
68 As such, the decision reflects 69 an "eminently functionalist" approach to commercial identity appropriation. In establishing the right of publicity as protecting an entirely different interest from the right of privacy, one focusing uniquely on economic injury rather than hurt feelings and mental anguish, 7° Judge Frank was merely responding to preexisting business practices. 71 The judge explained:
[I]t is common knowledge that many prominent persons (especially actors and ball-players), far from having their feelings bruised through public exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing advertisements, popularizing their countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines, busses, trains and subways. This right of publicity would usually yield them no money unless it could be made the subject of an exclusive grant which barred any other advertiser from using their pictures. 72 
Publicity's Descendibility
Despite its economic focus, the right of publicity's roots in privacy law made it difficult for some courts to shake the "personal" label. 73 In Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, the Supreme Court of California rejected the notion that the right of publicity was descendible. 74 The claimants in Lugosi were the heirs of actor B6la Lugosi, known for his role in the 1931 film, Dracula. 5 Lugosi's heirs brought suit against Universal Studios, the movie studio for which Lugosi had worked, seeking to recover profits made by the studio's licensing of the Lugosi's image, as the Dracula character, for merchandising purposes. 76 The court recognized that Lugosi had a proprietary interest in his identity 77 neighboring individuals. 9 ' Each form letter stated that its recipient and his or her neighbor had been selected as sweepstakes contestants by the magazine.
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The neighbor was identified by name, and each recipient was named as a "neighbor" in solicitation of another resident in the neighborhood. 93 In an ensuing lawsuit, Stilson v. Reader's Digest Assn., Inc., the neighbors complained that these letters were a misappropriation of their names to sell magazine subscriptions in violation of their rights to privacy. 94 In order to recover damages, however, California's privacy law required each recipient to prove mental suffering, a burden that ultimately defeated the neighbors' certification as a class.
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In response to and during this litigation, the California legislature added section 3344 to the state's Civil Code. 96 The statute was designed to resolve the neighbors' need to prove damages by providing a minimum statutory recovery of $30097 for any invasion of privacy by commercial appropriation. 98 As originally enacted in 1971, 99 California'spre mortem right of publicity statute provided:
Any person who knowingly uses another's name, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, for purposes of advertising products, merchandise, goods or services, or for purposes of solicitation of purchases of products, merchandise, goods or services, without such person's prior consent . . . shall be liable for any damages sustained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof. In addition, in any action brought under this section, the person who violated the section shall be liable to the injured party or parties in an amount no less than three hundred dollars ($300). 100 [Vol. 22:2 of section 3344 101 But as a known catalyst for the statute, the case's underlying facts illustrate that California's pre mortem right of publicity was initially motivated by emotion-based, privacy concerns rather than proprietary interests in commercial value. 0 2 Although the broad language of section 3344 seemed to allow for the inclusion of both types of identity protection, 1 0 3 Chief Justice Bird prompted a narrower reading of the statute in his Lugosi dissent:
Judgment was issued against the recipients in
The legislative history of section 3344 strongly suggests that the Legislature was concerned with an individual's right to privacy, not an individual's proprietary interest in his or her name and likeness . . . . In contrast to these numerous references to the right of privacy, there is no mention in the legislative documents of the right of publicity or the economic interest protected thereunder. 104
In 1985 the California legislature passed the Celebrity Rights Act, amending section 3344 to provide for the additional recovery of "any profits from the unauthorized use that are attributable to the use and are not taken into account in computing the actual damages.' 0 5 In contrast to the privacy motives of the original statute's enactment, the language added by the amendment evokes the economic focus of the now-recognized right of publicity. 0 6 The California Court of Appeals has since clarified that the statutory minimum can only be recovered as a measure of damages for mental distress, 0 7 while a defendant's "attributable" profits are only recoverable for injury to the commercial value of identity.' 0 8 Section 3344 therefore provides hybrid privacy-publicity protection for commercial appropriation of identity.' 0 9 The nature of the right asserted under the pre mortem statute-privacy or publicity--depends on the type of damages a claimant seeks.
Post Mortem Protection
In addition to its pre mortem amendments, the Celebrity Rights Act also 
B. Statutory Contradiction
Motivational interests aside, California's right of publicity statutes are functionally designed to protect people's proprietary interests in the commercial value of their identities.13 5 It follows that individual recognition of these rights must depend on whether a person's identity possesses commercial value. 36 Compounding interpretations of this commercial value requirement, set forth below, have established the prevailing view, at least academically, that all people-whether famous or anonymous-have rights of publicity in California's pre and post mortem context. 37 But the statutory addition of per mortem protection renders this conclusion ripe for reconsideration.
Pre Mortem Attachment
Pre mortem right of publicity claimants generally have little trouble proving the commercial value of their identities.
3 8 This is primarily because most section 3344 claims are brought by celebrities, 139 who generally make a living exploiting their personalities in one way or another. 40 Courts in California, however, have consistently voiced that non-celebrity claimants too are able to assertpre mortem right of publicity claims.' 136. In the pre mortem context, the commercial value requirement is implied by the hybrid nature of section 3344. ; see 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 148, § 9.14 n.12.
159. Rubin, supra note 158, at 302. These include "1) waiting until an appropriate medium for exploitation comes along, 2) personal sensitivities, 3) business judgment, 4) waiting until fame is at its peak, 50 death occurs before opportunity to exploit, 6) to specifically create a legacy for heirs, 7) where value could attach to name, likeness, etc. only after death, and 8) where the type of exploitation chosen might not be available during personality's lifetime." Id. at 302-03.
160. 1 McCARTHY, supra note 7, § 6:39 ("It is submitted that to read § 990(h) ( § 3344.1(h)) as a sensible whole, it must be concluded that everyone's identity has 'commercial value' at the time of death.").
161. Id. If credence is given to the established commercial value principles set forth above, something more than mere personhood but less than lifetime commercial exploitation is needed to endow an identity with commercial value. Presuming commercial value from a defendant's commercial use, this Note recognizes that any commercial use of a person's identity in the per mortem context necessarily occurs after that person's death. And because property rights transfer "on death," 163 a person whose identity is without commercial value at the time of death cannot be said to have transferred any property rights in that identity to his or her heirs. As such, California's per mortem publicity rights cannot be descendible-they are a posthumous creation.
IV. JUSTIFYING PUBLICITY-AS-PROPERTY
Even assuming that per mortem economic injury is possible under California's statutory right of publicity regime and that it is indeed the injury sought to be remedied by AB 585, a working policy justification eludes California's per mortem publicity-as-property model. This problem has "plagued the right of publicity" since its inception. 164 
A. The Property Syllogism
In endowing the right of publicity with the proprietary characteristic of assignability in Haelan Laboratories, Inc., 165 Judge Frank adamantly dismissed the inquiry into whether the right should be labeled a form of "property" as well as whether it maintained any other traditional property characteristics. 166 In a sentiment that was shared by several early commentators on the right of publicity, 1 67 Judge Frank stated, "[T]he tag 'property' simply symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a claim which has pecuniary worth." ' 168 During the right of publicity's emerging years, courts in the United States remained hostile toward the right's development and largely followed Judge Frank's functionalist position.1 69 Commentators, however, quickly latched onto the label debate and continued to develop the notion of publicity-as-property. 170 By the time California Civil Code section 990 was enacted in 1984, the right of publicity was widely considered a bona fide property right by courts and commentators alike.' 7 ' The statute explicitly adopts this trend by providing, "The rights recognized under this section are property rights, freely transferable or descendible ....
The right of publicity's expansion beyond Judge Frank's functional assignability was driven largely by a form of reasoning that commentators call the "property syllogism.' ' 173 Starting with the simple, but misleading, 74 premise that the right of publicity's assignability necessarily rendered it a form of property, many commentators jumped drastically to the conclusion that, because publicity is property, it must share all of the traditional characteristics of property, namely descendibility.17
5 This "formalistic" shift in reasoning has resulted in "a Frankenstein bearing little resemblance to [Judge Frank's] carefully considered functionalist purposes."' ' 76 The property syllogism was highly influential on the courts that initially considered the right of publicity's descendibility,1 77 and most court decisions that followed blindly applied the preceding courts' reasoning. 78 Thus, a descendible right of publicity was created with little consideration given to any policy supporting it.' 79 And once most states codified the descendibility of their right of publicity, the property-based approach became an unshakable legal certainty. 18 
B. Theory and Policy
Since the right of publicity's haphazard emergence as a form of intellectual property, courts and commentators have retrospectively attempted to justify exclusive ownership of the commercial value in identity according to traditional U.S. property theories. Although these approaches may be appropriate in isolated circumstances, none are suitable to comprehensively justify California's pre, post, and per mortem rights of publicity as property.
Labor Theory
The most common theoretical justification for granting exclusive property rights in identity is based on John Locke's natural rights labor theory. 8 1 According to Locke, "When a person 'mixe[s]' his labor with a thing in its natural state, he 'join[s] to it something that is his own' and 'thereby makes it his property . ,,,82. Courts and commentators have frequently justified the pre mortem right of publicity in this manner. 1 83 Chief Justice Bird argued in his Lugosi dissent, "A celebrity must be considered to have invested his years of practice and competition in a public personality which eventually may reach marketable status. That identity ... is the fruit of his labors and is a type of property."' 8 4 As a post mortem justification, Chief Justice Bird similarly claimed, "If the right is descendible, the individual is able to transfer the benefits of his labor to his immediate successors and is assured that control over the exercise of the right can be vested in a suitable beneficiary.' 85 Although the labor theory justification for a property-based right of publicity is initially appealing, postmodern critics of the right have found it to be a gross oversimplification of the cultural process by which commercially valuable identities are created.1 86 Celebrities derive their economic value from their individual power "to carry and provoke meanings,' ' 87 and "the media and the public always play a substantial part in the [meaning]-making process.'' 88 The media promote celebrities selectively, primarily through news and advertising, based on their need to tell dramatic, compelling, and entertaining stories that capture and hold the public's attention. 89 In turn, the public's reaction to or consumption of these personifications is what creates market value in particular identities.' 90 Therefore, no matter how much labor a person expends creating, monitoring, or shaping his or her image, the value of that person's identity always depends on whether the audience ultimately accepts it.' 9 ' Unlike with traditional labor, a celebrity cannot exclusively say, "I made it," of his or her commercially valuable identify, and as a result, any claim of exclusive entitlement to its associated economic value is unwarranted. 1 92 The labor justification for publicity rights is even less persuasive when applied to posthumous identity protection.
1 93 Whatever involvement a post mortem personality may have had in the creation of a valuable public image, the creative labor provided by that celebrity's heirs must have played a more tenuous role; 194 otherwise, the celebrity'spre mortem labor-based claim would be further undermined. Additionally, this Note argues, a non-celebrity cannot be said to have expended time, effort, skill, and money in pursuit of the death that prompted his or her per mortem publicity value. And because the commercial value of aper mortem identity is necessarily created after death, 1 95 the decedent is entirely removed from the meaning-making process.
Unjust Enrichment
The prevention of unjust enrichment is another common justification for the property-based right of publicity. 1 96 As the inverse of the labor rationale, the focus of unjust enrichment theory is on the defendant's "free riding" rather than the claimant's just desserts.
19 7 This theory was asserted for pre mortem publicity protection by the United States Supreme Court in Zacchini v. ScrippsHoward Broadcasting, the Court's only decision recognizing the right of publicity. 198 There, the Court proposed that a defendant should not get for free something of value from plaintiff for which the defendant would normally But the application of unjust enrichment theory to California's propertybased right of publicity is yet another extension of the property syllogism; "it assumes an entitlement on behalf of the plaintiff to prove such an entitlement should exist.", 20 1 In order for a defendant's free riding to be unjust, a right of publicity claimant must first have exclusive moral entitlement to the commercial value of his or her personality.
2 0 2 Without a working justification for the initial ownership, the unjust enrichment theory fails. 20 3 Moreover, the post mortem right of publicity effectively authorizes the heirs of the deceased personality to free ride on that personality's economic value, regardless of the heirs' involvement in generating that value. 
Economic Incentives
Another policy justification asserted for pre mortem publicity rights is that exclusive ownership provides an economic incentive for artistic creation. Analogous to the primary theory behind copyright and patent law, 20 6 this argument claims thatpre mortem exclusivity incentivizes people to expend the time, money, and energy necessary to develop valuable identities that ultimately produce socially beneficial works. 2°7 The United States Supreme Court also asserted this theory in Zacchini, 2 0 8 as did Chief Justice Bird, dissenting in Lugosi:
[P]roviding legal protection for the economic value in one's identity against unauthorized commercial exploitation creates a powerful incentive for expending time and resources to develop the skills or achievements prerequisite to public recognition .... While the immediate beneficiaries are those who establish professions or identities which are commercially valuable, the products of their enterprise are often beneficial to society generally.
9
Chief Justice Bird further alleged economic incentives as ajustification forpost mortem publicity protection, t0 claiming the assurance that an individual's heirs will continue to benefit from the investment in publicity value provides additional encouragement for the individual to make such an investment. 21 ' Critics of the economic incentives theory claim that it fails realistically to justify exclusive ownership of pre mortem publicity value. There is little evidence that modem celebrities would refuse to exercise their socially valuable talents or expertise without such ownership, 212 and it is equally possible that the wealth generated by a celebrity's publicity rights disincentivizes further exercise of that celebrity's talents. 213 Further, publicity value is a collateral source of income for most celebrities; thus, most would still be able to profit from the activities that generate their commercial value without exclusively exploiting their rights of publicity. 214 This is unlike an author's copyright or an inventor's patent, which is much more necessary to secure a financial benefit in the author's or inventor's works. [Vol. 22:2 398 Economic incentives theory is even more unrealistic in the posthumous context. In all likelihood, the post mortem right of publicity has a disincentivizing effect on a celebrity's heirs. Allowing heirs to inherit exclusive property rights in a deceased celebrity's identity provides them with no incentive to develop their own talents or identities and to offer them for society's benefit. 216 "[T]he celebrity already gathered fame and its attendant wealth, and the [heirs] may idly enjoy its benefits. 217 Moreover, economic incentives completely fails to justify'per mortem right of publicity protection. It is inconceivable that an individual can be incentivized to die, especially in any manner conceivably suitable for later commercial use. And it is unlikely that social and moral norms would tolerate a law that rewards such a practice. The per mortem context, therefore, allows a decedent no possibility of anticipating or reaping the potential benefits of his commercially valuable identity.
V. IDENTITY APPROPRIATION IN GERMANY
In response to the theoretical challenges asserted above, several commentators have recently proposed non-traditional, non-property justifications for the U.S. right of publicity. Notably, Kantian autonomy, as manifested through Germany's right of personality, has been suggested as an alternative rationale for protecting both the moral and economic interests people maintain in their identities. This Note extends this proposition as a means of reconciling California's pre, post, and per mortem rights of publicity.
A. The Right of Personality
German identity protection is comprised of statutory rights in a person's name and image and a judicially created general right of personality. 2 1 8 Most judgments concerning unauthorized identity appropriation arise under the specific statutes; 21 9 however, when they prove inapplicable or insufficient, the general right of personality serves as a "catch-all" or "gap filler" for other appropriation of identity claims. 220 
The Right to Image
The Right to Name
Section 12 of the German Civil Code (BGB) prohibits unauthorized use of another person's name. 228 It provides, "if the rights of the person entitled to use a name [are] injured because of another's unauthorized use of the same name, the person entitled to use the name has the right to claim to restrain disturbance by the other person., 229 The right to one's name includes an individual's surname and family name, as well as publicly known stage names, pseudonyms, and nicknames. 230 An action arises under section 12 BGB only if "the use of the name causes a likelihood of confusion among the public." 2 31 If there is no such likelihood of confusion, as is likely the case with most noncelebrities, the general right to personality provides supplementary protection for the right to name. 232 Germany's Federal Supreme Court has held the right to name to be inalienable and not descendible. 23 the rights to name and image by recognizing a "general right of personality. This right protects against all other infringements of an individual's personality. 23 6 The Court has established no conclusive definition of the right; rather, its scope is determined on a case-by-case basis. 237 Factual circumstances in which the general right of personality has been applied include intrusion into the private sphere; the publication of personal information; defamation; portrayal in false light; and most importantly, for the purposes of this Note, unauthorized commercial appropriation. 23 8 German courts have employed the inter-related concepts of dignity, autonomy, and self-determination in varying degrees to justify the scope of personality rights within these particular contexts. 239 
B. Theory and Policy
Unlike the U.S. right of publicity, Germany's right of personality is not an intellectual property right; it is a personal right grounded in the country's constitutional guarantee of human dignity.
24° Drafted amid national defeat and humiliation following the collapse of the Third Reich in 1945,241 the German Constitution (Basic Law) reflects a "conscious intention to elevate modem Germany beyond the inhumanity of Naziism.... ,24' This is evident in Article 1 (1), which states emphatically, "Human dignity shall be inviolable. ' 243 Article 1(2) strengthens this guarantee by emphasizing human rights as dignity's practical focus. 244 It provides, "The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the world. 24 5 With human dignity at its core, the Basic Law establishes a constitutional order for Germany in which human values "are not to be sacrificed for the exigencies of the day," as had occurred under the Nazi regime. 24 6 "The concept of human dignity in the Basic Law reflects the influence of .. Christian natural law, Kantian moral philosophy, and more individualistic, or existential, theories of personal autonomy and self-determination., 247 Although its drafters did not intend for the Basic Law to be strictly associated with any one of these philosophies, 248 Germany's Federal Constitutional Court has mainly followed Immanuel Kant's theory of moral autonomy in interpreting dignity's meaning. 249 
Kantian Autonomy
Kantian moral and political philosophy is founded on Kant's conception of human dignity. 25 0 Kant viewed dignity as deriving from the innate freedom required to exercise human reason in pursuit of autonomy, 251 with moral autonomy being "the highest goal of organized society.
25 2 Kantian autonomy, therefore, is considered the "universal" and "unconditional" human capacity for moral legislation. 253 It is self-governance, "free from moral determinism, and not motivated by sensuous desires.
25 4 Simplified, moral autonomy reflects the process of choosing that which is good because it is good. 255 Under this model, people can self-legislate only if they are free from external constraints. 256 Therefore, individual liberty must presuppose autonomy. 257 According to Kant, liberty is the "'one sole and original right that belongs to every human being by virtue of his humanity,' and it comprises 'the attribute of a human being's being his own master.' ' 258 Outside interference with one's person necessarily violates this innate right, and as such, autonomy requires that humans be treated "always as ends in themselves [and] 
Moral Self-Determination
Further rooted in Kantian conceptions of dignity and autonomy is Article 2(1) of the Basic Law, which provides, "Everyone shall have the right to the free development of his personality .. . .26o This constitutional principle facilitates the full development within society of everyone's individual capabilities, allowing all people to realize their inner persons. 261 For Kant, the development of the inner self is a right of moral-self determination, as is illustrated by Kant's view of authorial expression. 262 Kant considered an author's expression to be "an action of the will," a continuation of the author's inner self. 2 63 As such, a human being is considered to have a "'natural purposiveness' . . . to fulfill the speaker's capacity to 'communicate his thoughts.'264 An author's right in his communicative acts is therefore an innate right of self-ownership. 265 In this sense, only the author may decide to disclose his or her work and in what form such disclosure will
personality right, copyright is part of an author's ownership of the inner-self, and "economic interests are necessarily subsumed within [this] personal sphere. 270 This Note refers to the latter principle as "economic selfdetermination." 27 '
Significantly, for the purposes of this Note, German courts have interpreted 22 KUG, the right to image, in accordance with these German copyright principles. 272 "Just as the author has the inherent right to determine the communication of the author's thoughts to the public, the individual has the inherent right to determine whether and how his image will be displayed in the world., 273 In this light, 22 KUG constitutes a hybrid right, protecting both the moral and the economic interests in a person's image. 274 
C. Commercial Appropriation Cases
The suitability of Kantian autonomy as an alternative, reconciliatory approach to California's property-based rights of publicity is evident in Germany's application of the right of personality in commercial appropriation cases. There, German courts have generalized the principle of economic selfdetermination to extend 22 KUG's hybrid protection to the general right of personality. 2 75 As is illustrated by the case law below, this broad application allows for an assignable and descendible commercial interest in a person's identity, similar to the U.S. right of publicity. It also affords posthumous protection of a person's moral interests against unauthorized commercial appropriation, comparable to the privacy motives of AB 585.
company had an exclusive license to use all of Nena's "commercially exploitable rights, including the right to her own likeness, 277 which the manufacturer did not have consent to use. 278 In its defense, the manufacturer claimed that, "as an extension of the general personality right," the right to image is inalienable.
27 9 The Federal Supreme Court agreed, but concluded that the merchandising company was entitled to recover a fee regardless. 2 80 The Court stated,
[T]he plaintiff's claim is not... defeated by the fact that the contract.. . due to the nonassignability of the right in one's own likeness, did not confer rights upon the plaintiff, which the plaintiff could claim against third parties in its own name. At issue here is not the right to an injunction order but the right to recover a fee which plaintiff demands for the commercial exploitation of the vocalist Nena's likeness. The decision whether to award this recovery does not require a decision on the controversial question of whether or not the right to one's own likeness, due to its legal nature as a general .personality right, is transferable. The defendant's use of Nena's likeness gave rise to the plaintiff's right to recover the usual fee for permission to utilize the likeness.., and does not require that Nena's right in her own likeness had been transferred to the plaintiff.
2 8 '
Descendible Economic Interests
In the case of Marlene Dietrich, a theater production company authorized the use of Marlene Dietrich's name and image in conjunction with the sale of automobiles, cosmetics, and other merchandise to promote the company's 282 musical on the life of the late actress.
Dietrich's sole heir sought an injunction against and compensation for this commercial use, claiming posthumous infringement of Marlene's personality rights. 283 The company argued that posthumous personality rights protected only the non-material interests of the deceased, but the Federal Supreme Court disagreed. 284 Based on the recognized ability to exploit one's personality during life, the Court concluded that the inheritability of the elements of the right of personality having financial value was necessary to protect those same interests after death: 285 An effective posthumous protection of the elements of the right of personality which are of financial value is only guaranteed if the heir can step into the role of the holder of the right of personality and can, in defending the presumed interests of the deceased, proceed in the same way as that person could have done against an unauthorised exploitation. 286
Posthumous Moral Interests
In the case of Heinz Erhardt, the son of a well-known comedian sought an injunction against, not compensation for, the posthumous use of his deceased father's voice imitation in a radio advertisement. 2 87 The Hamburg Court of Appeals (OLG Hamburg) held that "an artist's personality could not be subjected to commercial exploitation immediately after his death" because of the deceased's "claim to dignity" and "the necessity to reserve the commercial exploitation to the artist's heirs., 288 The court emphasized that, because the general right of personality would have protected Erhardt's likeness during life, it would be constitutionally unacceptable if his personality could be freely imitated immediately after his death. 28 
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[Vol. 22:2 discussed above illustrate how the application of economic self-determination can serve as a comprehensive theoretical justification for California's statutory rights of publicity, which have proven incompatible with its property-based regime. 291 Economic self-determination accounts for the alienability and descendibility characteristics that have come to define California'spre andpost mortem rights of publicity, 292 while simultaneously providing for the personal, posthumous interests served by the state's pre mortem protection.
29 ' Thus, individuals in California would be able to recover profits for the unauthorized use of their commercially valuable identities, but commercial value would not be a pre-requisite for all posthumous protection. 2 94 Moreover, economic selfdetermination rationalizes the prevailing principle that all people have a right of publicity as an innate characteristic of personhood, 295 which better addresses the critiques of granting exclusive ownership in the cultural product of fame. 296 Admittedly, the Kantian foundation of Germany's right of personality does not exactly square-up with the law of the United States. 297 Although both U.S. and German law rest on the duality of liberty and autonomy, 298 in the United States, there is no designated moral value organizing this selfgovernance.299 "Americans [instead] see themselves as autonomous people who themselves determine the norms and values that infuse the social order., 300 But despite this disparity, personality ideals are not entirely unrecognized in the United States, 30 1 especially in California.
Over the last thirty years, moral rights 30 2 legislation has emerged in the United States as a form of limited personality protection. 30 3 As historically found in European law, this bundle of rights protects an artist's interest in his or her work as an expression of the artist's personality and the foundation of his or her artistic reputation. 30 Notably, subsection (a) of the Act states, "The Legislature hereby finds and declares that the physical alteration or destruction of fine art, which is an expression of the artist's personality, is detrimental to the artist's reputation, and artists therefore have an interest in protecting their works of fine art against any alteration or destruction., 3 0 8 Although the Act only provides for the rights of paternity 3 0 9 and integrity, 3 1 0 it is speculated that the right of disclosure was 311 omitted due to legislative concerns over federal copyright preemption.
An infringement of an artist's moral rights under the Act entitles the artist to injunctive relief, actual and punitive damages, reasonable attorneys' and expert witness fees, and "any other relief which the court deems proper., 31 2 More importantly, for the purposes of this Note, the Act provides for posthumous protection of these personal interests. 3 13 Subsection (g) of the Act states, "The rights and duties created under this section: (1) Shall, with respect to the artist, or if any artist is deceased, his or her heir, beneficiary, devisee, or personal representative, exist until the 50th anniversary of the death of the artist.,, 314 This Note does not suggest that the proposed personality-based identity protection is capable of integration with California's moral rights law. Rather, this law illustrates California's recognition of personality rights as a means of protecting a person's innate interest in the moral and economic selfdetermination of his or her personality-both during life and after death. California's per mortem right of publicity compromises the state's preexisting publicity-as-property statutory regime. AB 585 was motivated by the emotional concems found at the heart of privacy law, and its ability to address the economic injuries that define publicity rights is incompatible with the commercial value principles of California's pre and post mortem statutes. Moreover, the state's pre mortem protection overextends the theoretical justifications commonly purported for the state's property-based publicity rights. Germany's right of personality, however, presents a comparative model for reconciling California's incompatible right of publicity statutes. As justified by the Kantian-inspired theory of economic self-determination, the right of personality accounts for an assignable and descendible identity without requiring economic value or emotional injury. In this regard, California's protection against commercial appropriation could rightfully be considered an innate right of personhood.
